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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

MATTHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 20040
vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE

This appeal involves three consolidated actions,
including a class action, brought on behalf of investors in Grove
Finance Company of Pleasant Grove, Utah, seeking to recover the
full amount of their investment (plus interest) in Grove Finance
at the time that institution became insolvent.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
iThe Third District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable
Timothy R. Hansonf District Judge, granted Respondents" Motion
for Summary Judgment on the basis of governmental immunity.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the District Court's
order granting summary judgment.
STATEMENT QF FACTS
Respondents agree with some of the facts set forth in
Appellants' Statement of Facts, but controvert others, and
believe that some additional facts with citation to the record
should be before the Court.
A.

ADDITIONAL FACTS
1.

Prior to 1969, Grove Finance was licensed as both a

small loan business (under title 7, chapter 10 of the Utah Code
as it was then written), and an industrial loan corporation
without authority to issue thrift (title 7, chapter 8 as then
written) (R. 771) . During that period, the Utah Department of
Financial Institutions was aware of no problem in Grove Finance,
either by Department inspections or from any other source (JLii.) .
Appellants have not alleged any occurrence in this period as a
basis for liability.
2.

In 1969, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, or

U.C.C.C., was enacted in Utah as title 70B of the Utah Code; Utah
Code Ann. 7-10-1, et seq., the Utah Small Loan Act, was repealed,
and all small loan licenses were terminated (R. 771-2).
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Grove

Finance surrendered its industrial loan license at that time, and
was granted a license under the U.C.C.C., as were a number of
others previously licensed as small loan businesses (R. 771-2,
778-82; see also Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-102).*

Grove Finance held

no other license as a financial institution for the remainder of
its existence (R. 771-2, 786).
3.

From the time of the enactment of the U.C.C.C., the

policy of the Department of Financial Institutions was that the
auditing requirements and policy of fairly close fiscal
supervision which applied to banks and other institutions under
Utah Code Ann. title 7, chapter 1, did not apply to supervised or
regulated lenders licensed under title 70B.

It was determined at

that time that the reporting and examination requirements
contained in title 70B, regarding disclosure of loan terms and
maximum loan charges, were the only such requirements which
applied to supervised lenders (R. 772). This policy was set by
the Department's administration, was based upon the statutory
language in titles 7 and 70B, and was in accordance with what the
Department perceived to be the underlying purpose of the
U.C.C.C, to foster more open entry and competition in the cash
loan field (R. 772-3) . The Department administration concluded
that it had no authority to audit supervised lenders for
1

The texts of statutes and rules cited are set forth in Appendix

B, inlLa.
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financial soundness (id.; Deposition of Mirvin D. Borthick, pp.
115-16).
4.

This policy remained in effect during the remainder

of the existence of Grove Finance (R. 772, 786), and was applied
to all supervised and regulated lenders in the State of Utah (as
of 1980, approximately fifty supervised lenders and lf800
regulated lenders) (!£.).
5.

From 1969 to 1980, Grove Finance filed a composite

annual report with the Department each year, as required by Utah
Code Ann. 70B-3-505(2), and their loan records were examined each
calendar year by the Department, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 70B3-506.

No violation of the U.C.C.C. or any other law, or other

improper dealings, were ever indicated (R. 389-90, 693-4, 696,
773) .
6*

At some point, the Department received several

telephone inquiries as to whether debentures being sold by Grove
Finance were insured, and as to whether the caller could obtain a
refund from Grove for a debenture.

Upon checking with S. Hal

Haycock, Grove's chief executive officer, the Department was
assured that the problem arose from misstatements made by Grove
salesmen, which would not be made again, and that any complainant
would receive a full refund.

The Department also determined that

Grove salesmen were properly registered with the Utah Securities
Commission to sell debentures at that time (R. 773-4).
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7.

In March, 1980, the Department received a complaint

that Grove may be involved in a "check-kiting11 scheme (R. 375).
Commissioner Mirvin D. Borthick assigned two examiners to visit
Grove Finance to investigate the complaint (Id.) •
8.

The examiners found Grove Finance's record-keeping

inadequate to determine a balance between liabilities and assets,
particularly as to debentures which Grove Finance had sold.
Because of this, Commissioner Borthick caused a cease-and-desist
order to be issued on April 8, 1980, directing that no further
debentures or similar obligations be sold by Grove until a
satisfactory financial statement could be compiled.

The terms of

the order were agreed to by Grove's chief executive officer (R.
787, 790) .
9.

The Department retained a certified public

accountant and his firm to perform a complete audit of Grove
Finance and, during approximately the next three-month period,
monitored progress in the audit; an effort was made to explore
any possible means of resolving Grove Finance's financial
difficulties and of conserving whatever assets Grove had, so
that, if possible, the Grove investors would be able to recover
their investments (R. 787-8; Deposition of Howard D. Sherwood,
pp. 7, 34, 42-3; Borthick deposition, pp. 108-9, 117-18).
10.

The accountant confirmed that the Grove records

pertaining to supervised loans were generally in accordance with
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accepted accounting principles (Sherwood deposition p. 39).
However, apparently Grove Finance had sold a number of debenture
bonds which it treated almost as deposit accounts, evidencing the
debentures with either a bond or a document resembling a savings
passbook, and allowing withdrawals and deposits in odd amounts at
odd intervals (id., pp. 13-15; R. 867-95).
11.

In July of 1980, the Department determined with

certainty that employees of Grove Finance were disobeying the
cease-and-desist order and making inaccurate representations as
to the nature of Grove's business (Sherwood deposition, pp. 2930; Borthick deposition, pp. 32-3, 103-4).

Commissioner Borthick

immediately had prepared a Stipulation for an Order granting
possession of Grove Finance to the Department, which was signed
by Mr. Haycock for Grove; pursuant to the Stipulation, Judge
George Ballif of the Fourth District Court of Utah County entered
an Order Granting Possession, authorizing the Department to take
possession of the business and property of Grove Finance (R. 788,
791-4) .
12.

In September, 1980, jurisdiction over Grove

Finance was assumed by the United States Bankruptcy Court (R.
788-9) .
Respondents believe that the Procedural History set
forth at p. 5 of Appellants' Brief is accurate.
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B.

AREAS OF APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTROVERTED BY
RESPONDENTS
Respondents controvert the following portions of

Appellants1 Statement of Facts, for whatever significance these
matters may have to the questions now before the Court:
1.

Appellants state at page 2 of their brief that

Grove Finance "held itself out to the general public as accepting
monies on deposit" from the early 1970's until its closure in
1980.

No reference cited gives any indication that the sale of

debentures occurred for that period; the very earliest indication
in the record of a debenture transaction is Junef 1977 (R. 875),
and apparently all of the other debenture transactions in the
record occurred from 1978 on (R. 867-95).
2.

Appellants also allege that, from the early 1970's

on, Grove advertised through its agents and "in the mass media"
that "deposits" in Grove were insured.

No reference cited

mentions any date when advertising is supposed to have occurred.
The vague statements in the Hilton affidavit (R. 835) and the
Sherwood deposition (p. 23), cited by Appellants do not disclose
the place or manner of advertising alleged, and may be
inadmissible as hearsay.

On the other hand, Commissioner

Borthick testified that the Department was not aware of any
advertising done by Grove Finance (Borthick deposition, pp. 1516) .

-7-

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT (UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-1, ET
SEQ.) .

In Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983) , a
very similar action where a group of investors in Grove Finance
Company sued the State and Commissioner Borthick to recover the
full amount of their investment, this Court ruled that
governmental supervision of financial institutions is a
"governmental function" to which provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act apply.

The Court also held that Utah

Code Ann. 63-30-4, a section of the Immunity Act, authorizes
public employees to be joined in a representative capacity in
suits against governmental entities only where the entity in
question may be liable under the Immunity Act; "[i]n other words,
the governmental official or employee can only be sued in a
representative capacity when the governmental entity is liable."
Id. at 633.
In the instant action, Commissioner Borthick is named a
defendant in his representative capacity, as Commissioner of the
Department of Financial Institutions (R. 2), and it is evident
that all allegations relating to him center on activities in his
official capacity.

Appellants do not claim that Commissioner

Borthick acted with gross negligence, fraud, or malice (see
Complaints at R. 190-200; Nelson, R. 1-7; DeRose. R. 2-17) . An
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allegation that Commissioner Borthick engaged in any regulation
of state financial institutions in his role as a private
individual would be absurdf and Appellants make no such
suggestion.

Thus, the Madsen case indicates that the Court must

look to the Immunity Act to determine whether or not the State
may be sued in this action; and that, if the State is immune from
suit, so is Commissioner Borthick.
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1) waives immunity for damages
caused by the negligent acts or omissions of governmental
employees, except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise

or perform a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is based,
or . . .
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial,
suspension, or revocation of, ££ by the
failure or refusal i£ issue, deny,
suspend or revoke, any permit, license,

certificate, approval, order, or similar
authorization, or
(d) arises out of a failure to make an
inspection, or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection of
any property, or . . .

(f)

arises out of a misrepresentation

by said employee whether or not such is
negligent or intentional. . . .
(emphasis added)•
In light of the allegations made in the three
complaints on file in this action, the District Court correctly
concluded that Defendants are immune from suit on these specific
statutory grounds.
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A.

DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
This Court, while eschewing any single litmus-paper

test as to what constitutes a "discretionary function," has
indicated generally that such a function is one where the act or
decision in question requires "the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise," Little v. Utah State
Division of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah, 1983);
Carroll v. State Road Commission. 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888,
891 (1972), or where the immunity is necessary to shield
governmental decisions impacting on large numbers of people in
unforeseeable ways from legal actions, "the continual threat of
which would make public administration all but impossible."
Frank V, State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah, 1980).
Utah's Govermental Immunity Act was patterned after the
Federal Tort Claims Act, Carroll v. State Road Commission, supra,
496 P.2d at 890-891, and this Court has consistently applied a
substantially identical standard as federal cases construing that
Act, in determining the meaning of "discretionary function."
Frank v, Stater supra, 613 p.2d at 519.
Utah's exceptions to waiver of
governmental immunity closely parallel
those enumerated under 28 U.S.C., sec.
2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
This Court has followed the lead of
cases interpreting that act. Little v.
Utah State Division of Family Services,
£U£jLa, 667 P.2d at 51.
Federal cases in which the issue has arisen have
unanimously held that regulation of financial institutions is a
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discretionary function under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for
which regulatory agencies are immune from suit.
For example, in Emch v. United States. 630 F.2d 523
(7th Cir., 1980), cert, den., 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482
(1982) , shareholders in an insolvent bank and trust company which
was taken over by the F.D.I.C. brought suit against the
Comptroller of the Currency, the F.D.I.C, and the Federal
Reserve Board.

Very much as in the instant case, it was alleged

that the defendants failed:
. . . to properly and adequately
supervise, examine and control the
condition, performance, operation,
liquidity and solvency of American City
Bank . . . and . . . to take proper and
adequate measures to correct
deficiencies, . . . and . . . to take
proper and adequate measures to preserve
and conserve the assets of said bank
. . . . I£. at 525.
The Emoh complaint also alleged that the federal agencies had
been negligent in permitting the issuance of misleading reports
to the shareholders, in allowing fraudulent activities by the
bank's officers to occur, and in committing "mistakes, errors,
and omissions in the course of examining" the bank.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed a dismissal of the complaint, holding that such
allegations "fall facially" within the "discretionary function"
exception.

Id. at 528.

In determining whether a function is

discretionary, the Court said, relevant considerations include
whether the judgment exercised called for policy considerations
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and was one which officials should be free to make without the
fear of vexatious litigation.

!£. at 527.

The claims in JEmcJas

. . . were an attempt to saddle the
government with liability on the basis
of its failure, in the course of its
statutory regulatory activities, to
anticipate the financial difficulties of
American City Bank, to insure the
honesty and competency of its officers,
and to successfully prevent the losses
to [the] stockholders which resulted
from the bank's various difficulties.

These are claims of the type which
section 2680(a) was designed to preclude
. . .- . I&. at 529 (emphasis added).

in Pannhausen vt First National Bank of Sturgeon Bay* 538 F.supp.
551 (E.D. Wis., 1982), the plaintiffs sued the Comptroller of the
Currency and lower-level administrators under his supervision,
for failure to enforce the National Banking Acts against a bank
which had set off the plaintiffs' accounts against their
obligations.

Granting a motion to dismiss, the court cited the

Emch case for this dispositive principle:
. . . 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) [the
discretionary function exception]
precludes suits against agencies of the
United States involved in the regulation
and examination of banks based on
failure of the federal agency either to
supervise, examine, or control
adequately and properly the condition,
performance, or operation of a bank, or
failure of the federal agency to take
proper and adequate measures to correct
deficiencies existing in the bank. JL&.
at 561.

-12-

The court also held that a claim could not be stated for
"withholding relevant information from the public" under the
discretionary function exception, iii. at 562.
The Federal Reserve Bank and Comptroller of the
Currency were sued for failing to disclose the Franklin National
Bank's insolvency soonerf extending credit to the Bank after
learning of its difficulties, and allowing the Bank to remain
open as long as it did, in Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin
National Bank, 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir., 1977), cert. d£jQ., 434 U.S.
1012, 98 S.Ct. 726 (1978).

Affirming a summary judgment for

these defendants "for sound reasons of policy,M the Court of
Appeals stressed that the acts alleged were the result of
decisions which officials should be free to make without the
threat of vexatious lawsuits or alleged personal liability.

559

F.2d at 870. Other federal cases where summary judgment or
dismissal was granted for federal agencies alleged to have been
negligent in the regulation of financial institutions include

First Savings $ LQan Association Vt First Federal Savings and
Loan Association, 531 F.Supp. 251 (D. Haw., 1981), and 547
F.Supp. 988 (D. Haw., 1982) (actions against F.S.L.I.C.
dismissed); Davis v. F.D.I.C.. 369 F.Supp. 277 (D. Colo., 1974);
Maoellsen v. F.D.I.C.. 341 F.Supp. 1031 (D. Mont., 1972).

Each

of these actions was summarily dismissed on the basis of the
discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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The United States Supreme Court's most recent analysis
of the discretionary function exception, as it applies to
regulatory inspection activities by governmental agencies, is
particularly pertinent here.
467 U.S.

In United States v, Vayjg Airliner

, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984), the Court held that suits

could not be maintained against the Federal Aviation
Administration for its negligent failure to detect hazardous
conditions in airplanes which were in violation of federal air
safety regulations, 4n the course of the agency's inspection
prior to type certification of the airplanes.-

The FAA's

"spotcheck" program failed to find a non-fireproof trash
receptacle in one aircraft, and a faulty gasoline line to a cabin
heater in another, and both caused fatal in-flight fires.

The

Court of Appeals ruled, inter aliaf that the inspection of
aircraft for compliance with safety regulations did not entail
policymaking, and therefore was not a discretionary function.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court found in the legislative history of the Federal Tort
Claims Act an intention to exempt claims against government
agencies growing out of their regulatory activities, 104 S.Ct. at
2763.

The Court reaffirmed its analysis in Dalehite v. United

£fca££JB, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953), which held immune the
decision to implement a post-war fertilizer export program,
failure to determine the fertilizer's explosive capability, and
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failure to police the storage and loading of the fertilizer
before a dock-side explosion; the Court reiterated that
"discretionary function":
. . • includes more than the initiation
of programs and activities. It also
includes determinations made by
executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or
schedules of operations. Where there is
room for policy judgment and decision
there is discretion.
73 S.Ct. 956, cited at 104 S.Ct. 2764.

The Varig Court noted

that the nature of the conduct, not the status of the actor,
determines a discretionary function, and continued:
. . . whatever else the discretionary
function exception may include, it
plainly was intended to encompass the
discretionary acts of the Government
acting in its role as a regulator of the
conduct of private individuals. Time
and again the legislative history refers
to the acts of regulatory agencies as
examples of those covered by the
exception
104 S.Ct. at 2765.

The Court held that both the FAA's decision

to adopt a spot-check program, and its application of the program
to the particular airlines in question, were immune discretionary
functions:
Here, the FAA has determined that a
program of "spot-checking"
manufacturers' compliance with minimum
safety standards best accommodates the
goal of air transportation safety and
the reality of finite agency resources.
Judicial intervention in such
decisionmaking through private tort
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suits would require the courts to
"second-guess" the political, social,
and economic judgments of an agency
exercising its regulatory function. It
was precisely this sort of judicial
intervention in policymaking that the
discretionary function exception was
designed to prevent.
•

• •

In rendering the United States amenable
to some suits in tort, Congress could
not have intended to impose liability
for the regulatory enforcement
activities of the FAA challenged in this
case. The FAA has a statutory duty to
promote safety in air transportation,
not to insure it.
Id. at 2768, 2769 (emphasis by the Court).
Similarly, the Utah Department of Financial
Institutions may have a duty to promote investor security, but it
has no duty or ability to insure it (point II, infx^).

The

Department's decisions as to the form its examinations will take,
and the performance of those examinations at particular banks,
closely resemble in this setting the FAA's adoption of a
particular inspection program and the performance of inspections
of individual airplanes.

The Department's activities in this

area clearly fall within the ambit of its role as a regulator of
the acts of private individuals and entities, pursuing
enforcement and inspection duties, and under both Dalehite and
its explication in Varig. must be deemed discretionary.
A non-federal case squarely on point here is Gormley v.
fiiaifif 54 Ga.App. 843, 189 S.E. 288 (1936), where the State
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Superintendent of Banks did not examine the savings and loan
institution in which the plaintiff deposited her money, because
(as in this case) he had concluded that the institution was not a
bank which he was statutorily authorized to examine; the
plaintiff lost her savings when the institution failed.

The

C o u r t f o u n d that t lit' S u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n w a s a
discretionary function, and dismissed the action.

The case was

found controlling in State v. Gormley, 57 Ga.App.. 714, 196 S.E.
90, 9 J (1 9 3 8) i- w 1: ie r e a f oi:me i: i nv e s t o r i n t h e sam e i i :t s t i t u 11 on
alleged that the Superintendent's "willful neglect to perform his
legal duty" caused the loss of her investment.

The action was

summarily dismissed.
This Court has not yet had occasion to rule on whether
regulation of financial institutIons i s ai i i mmi ine discreti onai:y
function.

However, the most recent analysis of what constitutes

such a function clearly indicates that this action may not be
maintained,

!in iiiUlfe V , UJLflli. jSiaLfc J D A y i t l M i t-'i .Ejanuly S e r v i c e s ,

supre, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983), citing Evangelical United
Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (Wash.,
1965), the Coui t. looked to the? foJlowinq tactois In decidii lg
whether a function is discretionary:
(1) Does the challenged act, omission,
or decision necessarily involve a basic
governmental policy, program, or
objective?
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or
decision essential to the realization or
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accomplishment of that policyr program,
or objective as opposed to one which
would not change the course or direction
of the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision
require the exercise of basic policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on
the part of the governmental agency
involved?
(4) Does the government agency involved
possess the requisite constitutional,
statutory, or lawful authority and duty
to do or make the challenged act,
omission, or decision? 667 P.2d at 51.
In the United Brethren case it was held that the application of
variable security measures in making housing and work assignments
to an incarcerated juvenile (who escaped and burned down
plaintiffs' buildings) was a discretionary function.

In weighing

the four questions listed above, the Washington Court looked to
the long history of statutory governmental regulation in the
area; the furtherance of such regulatory policy by the function
in question; and the nature of the state agency's statutory
authority to perform the function.
Applying these criteria to this case, it is clear that
a discretionary function is involved.

Regulation by the State of

certain enumerated financial institutions has been mandated by
statute since at least 1911 (see, e.g., legislative history of
Utah Code Ann. 7-1-6 and -7).

As financial conditions and

institutions have changed, the statutory parameters of regulation
have been adjusted accordingly to balance the competing public
needs for fiscal safety, on the one hand, and free competition in
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c e r t a 11 i f i n a i i c i a 3 a i: e a s,, c r i 11 :i € o t h e i: (s e e , e . g „, C o m m i s s i o n e i: s,:
Comment on Utah Code A n n , 70B-3-503, and at 7 Uniform Laws
Annotated, 242-3) .2

Both common sense, and the deposition

t e s t Jiiioii^ a m i :\t i i riav il si o n l i l t ,

indicate

U u i ! the ik i c i m i ru"i t i o n

of which financial institutions are subject to what kind of
regulation is a decision essential to carrying out the State's
regulatory po3 icy.

Commissioner Brimhall

(R

1 7 2-3)

and

Commissioner Borthick (R. 786) both attest that the Department's
policy

in thit aiea i n v o l v e b a s i c p o l i c y j u d g m e n t a n d e v a l u a t i o n ,

I.e., a determination of what form of regulation both the
language and purpose of the U.C.C.C. would permit for supervised
lenders.
The Department's conclusion that no authority existed
for assuring t^p financial soundness of supervised lenders was
e 11111 e I y c o

a in a 11 e i: o f ] a w (t

" o 1 1 1 1 1 1 ••• A f b e I ow) .

Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that that determination was
in error, it was still a discretionary act for which immunity is

retained

GQrptley yf Stater supra; state v. Gormleyr supra.
Appellants seek to circumvent the clear application of

t h e " d i s c r e t i o n a r y £iinct i o n " e x c e p t i o n by a r g u i n g

(1) t h a t , in

former title 7 of the Utah Code, the Legislature determined the
kind and manner of supervision to which Grove Finance was
2

Excerpts from the Commissioners 1 comments on the U.C.C.C. are
set out in Appendix D r infra.
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subject, rendering such a determination non-discretionary
(Appellants' Brief, points II-B, -C, and -E), and (2) that
Respondents1 activities did not amount to high-level policymaking decisions, and therefore were not discretionary functions
(Appellants1 Brief, points II-A and - D ) .
Of course, Appellants' first argument entirely begs the
point that the title 7 examination scheme did not apply to Grove
Finance, and that Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-506, the examination
provision of the U.C.C.C., did not authorize auditing for
financial soundness (see Point II-A, inixa)•

It also ignores the

solid case law, set out above, which holds that a decision as to
what regulatory control is statutorily authorized for particular
classes of institutions, even if erroneous, is discretionary,
e.g., Gormley v, Stater supra; and that such regulation is
precisely the kind of activity the "discretionary function"
exception was intended to include, e.g., Emch v. United States,

Appellants' citation of Fidelity Casualty Company of
New York v. Brightman, 53 F.2d 161 (8th Cir., 1931), does not
support their position.

Aside from the fact that this Court

should apply the criteria it has recently set out in the Little
case as to discretionary function, rather than 1931 Missouri law,
the Fidelity Casualty result favors a finding of immunity for
Respondents.

The Missouri Commissioner of Finance sought to
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enjoin the prosecution of some sixty-one actions by depositors in
a defunct bank, seeking recovery on the Commissioner's bond for
his alleged negligence in permitting a bank to remain open after
tie ,1 earned ot its financial plight, while he attempted to work
with existing management to save the bank.

After discussing

Missouri statutes regarding the Commissioner's duty to determine
ai id report inso] \ ei 1 cy,- the • Cour t of Appeals stated:
It might be a mandatory duty of the
Commissioner of Finance to settle the
question of insolvency or danger to
depositors f but how the question should
be determined is a matter of judgment
and discretion. A mere erroneous

conclusion uninfluenced by Felice or
corruption cannot be the basis of an
action for damages.
•

• •

It is not for us to determine whether
the state officials exercised poor
judgment or to substitute our judgment
for theirs. 53 F.2d at 168, 169
(emphasis added) .
In the instant action. Appellants similarly aver that
Commissioner Borthick failed to enforce the cease-and-desist
order (Appellants

Briet, p. 2 5 ) , Such is not the case (e.g., R.

787-8), but even if it were, such activities are discretionary
and immune from suit.
Appellants 1 argument also misperceives the nature of a
statutory immunity.

The point of an immunity is that it bars an

action £X£jQ ,ii duty and otnei elements of a negligence claim can
be set out.
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The Fidelity Casualty case noted State ex rel. Funk v,
lilXUfiXr 42 S.W.2d 594 (Mo., 1931) (also cited by Appellants) for
the proposition that a duty to examine a financial institution
annually may have been ministerial, but decisions as to the
length, character, and extent of the examinations were
discretionary.

The Turner case found that, where a bank examiner

failed to discover a large embezzlement during an examination,
the State was immune from suit.

Thus, any claim Appellants have,

based on any purported inadequacy of the annual U.C.C.C.
examinations which were performed is similarly barred.
Appellants' second contention—that discretionary
immunity only applies to policy-making functions—is similarly
ill-taken. As discussed supraP this Court has not applied any
single, mechanical test in this area, without properly weighing
the pertinent statutory setting and aims; the policy evaluation,
judgment, and expertise necessarily involved in performing the
function in question;;

and the practical need of shielding far-

reaching governmental decisions from the threat of continual

litigation, Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services
supra, Frank v> State/ £U£i£.
Appellants aver that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
was patterned after California's immunity statutes, and reason
from this that the result in this case should be the same as that
reached in two cases decided under California's "discretionary
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function" statute.

It is true, as Appellants suggest, that the

C a ,1 i i o r n I a I a w J- w i- • i v m /»111 () r. e el <j e n e r a'! '*

Utah Legislature considered Senate Bil
Governmental Immunity Act.

I € b a t e w h e n t h t ] 4 6c;

vhich became the

Howeverf the only reference to

California statutes was that the proposed Utah bill employed the
same general approach as California, preserving immunity with
specif ical ly enamei at ed except ions; * then

is pimply no

indication at all in the debates that Utah Code Ann.
63-30-10(1)(a) was patterned after the differently worded
C a 1 i f o r n i a s t. a t u t e .ft,,1s o , t. h e C a 1 i f o 1111., t c a s e f. e 11. e <i b y

Appellants were decided after passage ot the Utah Act, so there
can be no pretense of a legislative intent to adopt their
holdings.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the California
case 1 aw is

of probative assistance, that state's appellate

courts have properly refused to apply a purely mechanical
semantic analysis regarding discretionary function, looking
instead l\n whether the act requ i red "persona I del iberation,
decision, and judgment."

Thompson v. Alameda County, 27 Cal.3d

741, 614 P.2d 728, 731 (1980).

Far from applying the blanket

test I hat disci et mndi y immunitv "only appi iff,, to ba> n
policymaking decisions" (Appellants' Brief, p. 19), the
3

Excerpts from the legislative debate referring to the
California statutes are set out in Appendix C F infra.
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California courts have recently ruled that discretionary
functions include, e.g., an improper selection of a mental health
facility for an adjudged incompetent, Foy v. Greenblott. 141
Cal.App.3d 1, 190 Cal.Rptr. 84 (1983); a Highway Patrol officer's
decision not to investigate a stranded automobile, Bonds v.
State. 138 Cal.App.3d 314, 187 Cal.Rptr. 792 (1982); an officer's
request that parties in a dispute with a landowner leave the
property, Watts v. Sacramento County. 136 Cal.App.3d 232, 186
Cal.Rptr. 154 (1982)1 the appointment of a delinquent's mother as
his custodian, where the delinquent subsequently committed a
murder, Thompson v. Alameda County, supra; the determination of
the lowest responsible bidder to a public contract, Pacific

Architects Collaborative v. Stater loo cai.App.3d n o , 166
Cal.Rptr. 184 (1980); and a decision not to have lifeguards
patrol a particular dangerous stretch of beach, Fuller v. State.
51 Cal.App.3d 926, 125 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1975).

None of these cases

involved high-level policy-making, yet each activity was
discretionary.
If Appellants in the instant action are held to have
stated a cause of action, it is clear that every investor in any
financial institution of any kind which fails (whether due to the
stupidity or dishonesty of its officials, recessionary economic
times, or whatever the cause) may henceforth bring suit against
the State and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions to
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recover I he lull .-liiiount of tin

investment..

"T'lit Inescapable fact

to be faced in this case is that f in regulating financial
institutions throughout the state, the Commissioner must be free
cal decisions based upon his
informed judgment and expertise, decisions often likely to raise
the ire of one group or another, whether management 01
shareholders U L depositors or others; in determining when and
whether to take possession of an institution, the Commissioner
must exercise his sound discreti 0:1 1 i n weigi :ii ng whether abrupt
closure or continued efforts at possible recovery will best serve
the public and the investors; and to subject the State and the
Commissi one t t* u put en t i a 1 1 i ab i 1 i t.y whe nev v t a par ty 01 sagr ees
with such a decision would effectively cripple all regulatory
efforts in this area.
The Com: t in,, re Franklin National Bank Securities
Litigation, 478 F.Supp. 210, 222 (E.D.N.Y., 1 9 7 9 ) , made the
following cogent observations as to thr wisdom of applying
immunity in thp *rp* nf financial

regulation:

Officials of administrative agencies
possess resources and expertise
unavailable to courts. Their policy
decisions rest upon delicate technical
and political judgments of the risks and
benefits of possible courses of action.
It is highly unlikely that damage

actiopg brought in the courts will
consistently produce a more desirable

balancing of the competing policy
considerations

[citations omitted]
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Moreoverf allowing such review of
agency policy decisions in the guise of
damage actions would disrupt the
intricate balance of power among the
branches of government that the
constitution requires; it would unduly
elevate the courts. See Raichle v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915
(2d Cir. 1929) ("The remedy sought would
make the courts, rather than the Federal
Reserve Board, the supervisors of the
Federal System, and would invoke a cure
worse than the malady."). The extent
that agency officials have inadequately
exercised their discretion, or have
inequitably balanced the risks of agency
action, presents a political problem to
be solved by legislation or changes in
agency personnel, and not a judicial
problem to be solved by the imposition
of tort liability. [Citation omitted.]
(emphasis added.)
Finally, it is obvious as a matter of sound legal
analysis and of ordinary common sense that, in providing for
regulation of Utah's financial institutions, the Legislature did
not intend to establish the State as an insurer or guarantor for
every dollar invested in every financial institution.

Yet that

would be the ineluctable result if Appellants were to succeed in
this "attempt to saddle the government with liability" on the
basis of its financial regulatory activities, Emch v- United
States, suprar 630 F.2d at 529.

The Emcll court approvingly cited

the following from Zabala CI entente v. United States. 567 F.2d
1140, 1151 (1st Cir., 1977), regarding claimed liability under
OSHA laws:
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W e do not believe that the expanded role
of the federal government in the safety
area through such legislation as OSHA
indicates an intent of Congress to make
the United States a joint insurer of all
activity subject to inspection. . . Nor
do w e believe that there is any sound
policy basis for requiring that
government attempts to protect the
public must be accompanied by per se
tort liability if they are
unsuccessfully carried out. Cited 630
F.2d at 5 2 7 , n. 4 .
li i this case, the substance of Appellants 1

allegations

is that Respondents erred in determining the authority for and
manner of examination of Grove Finance, ai id erred ii I tl :ie ways i n
which they enforced the cease-and-desist order after Grove's
financial irregularities w e r e discovered.

When such allegations

a r e e x am I n e d i n J i g h t c f t h e c r i t e r i a a ppl i e d by t h i s C o u n t a i I d
federal courts for discretionary immunity, the pertinent
statutes, and public policy considerations, immunity clearly
applies,

The PisLi uM: Court's granting of summary judgment on

this ground w a s proper, and should be affirmed.
B.

ISSUANCE OR REVOCATION OP LICENSE; ISSUANCE. QE QiiDLI:
In paragraph 11 of DeRose v. state, one of the three

actions consolidated here, it is alleged that the State
negligently issued a license as a requlat*:,d lender tc: • Grove
Finance, absent adequate investigation (peRose. R, 5 ) . IiI
paragraph 1 5 , Appellants claim that the State failed in its duty
to revoke Grove" F licenn-

dti.l.
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hvvn

if tint, these allegations

would not support a cause of action against the State.

Under

Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(c), immunity is specifically preserved
for injury arising both from the issuance of a license, and by
the failure to deny or revoke a license.

The broad statutory

language on its face preserves immunity generally in the area of
governmental licensing, dependent as that function is upon the
exercise of informed discretion and judgment by the licensing
authority.

Insofar as the alternative cause of action in the

DeRose Complaint, or any other allegation in this matter, seeks
recovery for issuance of a license or failure to revoke a
license, such portion of the suit must be dismissed under
63-30-10(1)(c).
Appellants also allege that Respondents "totally failed
to enforce the cease and desist order" (Appellants' Brief, p.
25).

The factual fallacy of this position (R. 787-8; Borthick

deposition, pp. 30-34) and applicability of discretionary
immunity are discussed in the preceding sub-point.

Appellants'

citation of Seymour National Bank v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1177 (Ind.
App., 1979), as applying to this point is somewhat puzzling;
Seymour was a wrongful death action for the negligent or willful
misconduct of a state trooper in participating in a high-speed
chase, so its pertinence to this case is not clear.

The opinion

of the Indiana Court of Appeals was subsequently vacated in
Seymour National Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind., 1981),
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appeal dismissed, 4 57 11, t: 1 I 27 , 1 02 S. Ct

2 9S.1 (1982") r on the

basis of Indiana's statute preserving immunity for the
enforcement of laws.
Appellants.' 1 ' c l a i m c l e a r l y " a i i s e s out, of t h e i s s u a n c e ,
» of

, , lam] o r d e r , " arid is t h u s b a r r e d u n d e r U t a h C o d e A n n *

63-30-10(1)(c).

Again, the statutory language presetving

immuni ty from claims ari sing from the issuance of "any . ,
approval f order, or similar authorization" is broad, and the
policy underlying this pi:ovIsion seems to be 11" ,.at pu 1: • Jl i c entities
will not be subjected to liability or cast in the role of
guarantors of safety in all areas where they are charged with
super \; i s I ng r e s po n s i b 1 1 i t i e s £ o r ] i c e n s I ng o r o r d e r i n g e i th e r
a c t i o n or a r e s t r i c t i o n of a c t i v i t i e s by private p a r t i e s .
Moreover, to whatever extent Appellants may base their
act. inn on an <-il legal ion that Commissioner Borthick pursued the
order granting possession either too early or too late, the claim
would also be barred by Utah Code Ann, b.3- 50-lCMe), preserving
immunity where injury:
« , arises out of the institution or
prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause. . .
C.

INADEQUATE QR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION
Perhaps the gravamen of Appellants 1 Complaints in these

actions is that the State failed to inspect, or inadequately or
n e g 1 i g e n t ] j i n s p e c t e d, t 1: i e i: e c o r d s o f G i: o v € • F i n a n c e e i t h e r u n d e r
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title 7 (e.g., R. 3-6) or under title 70B (e.g., R. 7)

Utah Code

Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d) specifically preserves the State's immunity
from suit for failure to make an inspection, or for making an
inadequate inspection, and Plaintiffs' action must also be
dismissed on this ground.
This Court was confronted with an analogous situation
in White v. State, 579 P.2d 921 (Utah, 1978), where a plaintiff
who was injured by the machinery in a vegetable cannery alleged
that the State, by inspection, should have been aware of
violations of the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act at the
cannery.

A far stronger case for recovery was present in white

than in the instant matter, because Utah Code Ann. 35-9-13(d)
provides that one who is injured by failure of the Industrial
Commission to seek relief for OSHA violations may bring an action
for appropriate relief.

The Court stated that the OSHA statute

was not a waiver of governmental immunity and, relying upon Utah
Code Ann. 63-30-10(1) (a) (discretionary function) and (d)
(failure to make an inspection), held that the State was immune
from suit.

As to the sound public policy basis for immunity in

this instance, the Court stated:
The legislature, in setting up the
Occupational Safety and Health Division
in 1973, had no intention of making it
the scapegoat for every industrial
accident. I&. at 924.
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In t h e instant a c t i o n , of c o u r s e , A p p e l l a n t s have cited n o
statutes (because there a r e none) w a i v i n g t h e state's immunity or
giving disappointed investors a cause of action against t h e State
or its o f f i c e r s .

A s in the O S H A area, the L e g i s l a t u r e h a s set up

c e r t a i n limited, w e l l - d e l i n e a t e d i:egi :i] atory cont ro 1 s • ::>vei:
financial i n s t i t u t i o n s , b u t h a s not undertaken to act as a
guarantor of t h e safety of all financial a c t i v i t i e s , nor intended
111rodk tj l 11 ( SI d t i • 1 i a b I €• £ o!" a J J 1 o s s e h w h ,i c 11 c > v c u r

11" i e g u 1 a t o r y

efforts do not create a world of perfect fiscal safety for
investors.
Appe 1 1 ai 11 s ag a i i: I see k t o av oI d th i s conc 1 u s i on by
claiming that t h e Utah Immunity A c t w a s patterned after
C a l i f o r n i a ' s l a w , and t h e r e f o r e , the scope of Utah Code A m i .
I .*- v. • . • . c^ i s ] imited by t h e language oi the C a l i f o r n i a
statute.4

(Appellants' Brief, point III.)

Of course, just t h e

contra r y 11 11 ue ; i h» " n u (« Leg a slatur e * s 1 -i i ] ui c t o adopt t hea d d i t i o n a l , limiting language present in the C a l i f o r n i a section
must b e taken to indicate an intention to make the scope ci the
Ut a h st a I. u t e 11> coadc;-1 , e xtend i nq i inmun i t y i * > 11 > t, M inspection of
any p r o p e r t y . u
Nor c a n t h e t w o s e n t e n c e s of Senate d e b a t e , cited by
A p p e l l a n t s (their Bri

easonably applied as

4

Compare Utah Code A n n . 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 0 ( 1 ) ( d ) with C a l i f o r n i a
G o v e r n m e n t Code 8 1 8 . 6 , in Appendix B .
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limiting the application of Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d) to the
two casually mentioned examples (plumbing and furnace
inspections).

Were that the case, substantially different

results would have obtained in Velasgueg v. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970) (State immune
from suit for failure to inspect railroad crossing and direct
installation of active warning devices) and White v. State, supra
(State immune for failure to performed adequate OSHA inspection),
both cited by Appellants.
Instead, both the broad statutory language and prior
precedent suggest an intent that government should not be
subjected to liability for its regulatory enforcement activities
in inspecting the property of private individuals and entities
for compliance with applicable statutes and regulations—even
when such inspections are less than perfect and failed to detect
particular non-compliance.

Implicit here are the same policy

considerations relied on by the Supreme Court in United state vs.

varig Airlines, supra, 467 u.s.

, 104 s.ct. 2755, 2765 (1984):

subjecting such regulatory activities to second-guessing though
tort actions would seriously impair the ability of execute
agencies to efficiently function in these areas.

Like the Varig

plaintiffs. Appellants base their action on an alleged failure to
inspect; immunity is preserved by Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d).
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TV

NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION
In paragraph 30 of the Hilton Amended Complaint

ref en i i!it.| to the cease-and-desist order issued by Commissioner
Borthick, Appellants state that they Mhad no indication from the
State .

that such an oraei w

Nelson Complaint, Count Two, P

** . •
-

,»

Appellants also allege

(e.g., Hilton Amended Complaint, paragraph 16, R. 194) that if
R e s p o n d e n t s lhad p r o p e r ".1 y p e r f o r m e d t h e i i: duti e s , A p p e l l a n t b w o u l d
not havt invested their funds in Grove Finance,

Ifr ; ; these

allegations. Appellants wish to include iiI their cause of action
ii claim that somehow thei i: .1 osses resulted from, the fact that
they were not informed earlier of Grove Finance's financial
condition, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(f) al so I >a rs thi s action.
That bection preserves immunity for a] 1 misrepresentations,
whether negligent or intentional.
On ce again

n s o 1 i d 1 it n e o f i e d e n a 1 <. • a s e s, c o n s 11 u ,i 11 y

the misrepresentation exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. 2680(h), have barred claims arising out of banking and
s e c u r i t i e s regulation b) tinier a 1 a g e n c i e s *

In F i r s t S t a t e Bank

of Hudson County v r . United States, 473 p.supp. 33

(D.N.J.,

1978), affirmed on other grounds, 599 F.2d 558 (3d cir., 1979),
HSJLl

d&Ji..- "144 li.i, J D M , 10(1 iS-Ct:. 8 6 2 1 1 9 8 0 ) , t h e p l a i n t i f f

based its action in part on the failure of the F.D.I.C. to notify
the Bank's board of directors of irregularities discovered in a
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bank examination.

The district court found that this amounted to

a claim of implied misrepresentation an allegation that the
board was misled by the F.D.I.C.'s failure to take any of the
statutory enforcement steps it had authority to take.

Such a

claim was held barred by the misrepresentation exception in the
Federal Tort Claims Act.

Other cases with the same result, where

an intentional misrepresentation was alleged, include First
Savings & Loan Association v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Association. 531 F.Supp. 251, 255 (D. Haw., 1981) (barred action
for damages against F.S.L.I.C. for allegedly joining in
conspiracy to place plaintiff in receivership); and United States
Vt SheehfrP Properties, In?*, 285 F.Supp. 608 (D. Minn., 1968)
(barred counterclaim against United States Agency for
International Development for failure to inform the defendant of
facts concerning two corporations which allegedly would cause the
defendant not to invest in the corporation).
Thus, even if Appellants could prove that they were
misled by Respondents' failure to inform them earlier of problems
at Grove Finance, this would simply amount to a claim of implied
misrepresentation.

Particularly in light of this Court's

reliance on federal case law construing parallel provisions of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, Little v. Utah State Division of
Family Servicesf supra, this action must also be deemed barred by
the misrepresentation provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.
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II.

RESPONDENTS HAD NO DUTY TOWARD INVESTORS
IN GROVE FINANCE COMPANY UPON WHICH TORT
LIABILITY MAY BE BASED.

It is a rudimentary principle of tort law that a
prerequisite for liability in negligence is the existence of a
duty of care running from the alleged tortfeasor to the injured
plaintiff.

Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed.f p. 143. Duty is Ma

question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the
benefit of the particular plaintiff," and no liability may be
founded "upon the breach of a duty owed only to some person other
than the plaintiff. . . . 'Negligence in the air, so to speak,
will not do."' !£., p. 206; see Gray v. Scott. 565 P.2d 76, 78
(Utah, 1977), citing Restatement of Torts (Second), Section
328(b).

The existence of a duty "is entirely a question of law .

. . and it must be determined only by the court," and if no duty
is found to be present, the defendant is entitled to a judgment
in his favor, Prosser, supra, p. 206.
Respondents submit that they had no statutory authority
or duty to examine Grove Finance each year for financial
soundness, as Appellants claim; and even if such authority
existed, it would not give rise to a duty of care to Appellants
upon which tort liability could be based.

Respondents are also

entitled to judgment on this basis, even if the District Court's
ruling were not sustained on immunity grounds.

It is well

settled that a trial court's judgment may be affirmed on
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different grounds from those relied upon below wheref as here,
the other grounds were presented to the trial court, do not
involve disputed facts, and have been fully briefed on appeal
(Appellants' Brief, point I). Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar
Hills Development Company, 614 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah, 1980).

A

judgment will be affirmed on proper legal grounds, even if such
grounds were not relied upon by the district court, Branch v.
Western Petroleum, Inc.. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah, 1982), Matter pf
Estate of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1982), and this principle
fully applies to appellate review of summary judgments, Allphin
Realty. Inc. v. Sine. 595 P.2d 860 (Utah, 1979), Goodsel v.

Department of Business RegvaatipPr 523 p.2d 1230 (Utah, 1974).
A.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Appellants argue that Grove Finance was somehow a

supervised financial organization under title 7 of the Utah Code,
whose financial soundness the State had a statutory duty to
insure; and that based upon Utah Code Ann. 7-1-7 as then written,
the alleged failure to fulfill this duty provides a basis for
liability (Appellants' Brief, p. 7; Hilton Amended Complaint,
First and Second Causes of Action, R. 191-5; DeRose Complaint,
paragraphs 6-10, R. 3-4; Nelson Complaint, Count One, R. 4). A
brief review of the statutory scheme which applied to Grove
Finance is necessary in order to appreciate the fallacy of these
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contentions.
Under Utah Code Ann. 7-1-7r a statute initially enacted
in 1911, the institutions over which the state bank commissioner
(now the Commissioner of Financial Institutions) had authority
were set out:
All banks, all loan and trust
corporations, all building and loan
associations, all industrial loan
companies, all credit unions, all small
loan businesses required to obtain a
license under any provision of law, and
all bank service corporations shall be
under the supervision of the banking
department, and shall be subject to
examination by the bank commissioner and
the examiners.
Utah Code Ann. 7-1-8, enacted initially in 1913, set out the
Commissioner's examination responsibility:
The bank commissioner, or an examiners,
shall visit and examine every bank,
savings bank, every loan and trust
corporation, every building and loan
association, every industrial loan
company, every small loan business, and
every co-operative bank, at least once
in each year. At every such examination
careful inquiry shall be made as to the
condition and resource of the
institution examined, the mode of
conducting and managing its affairs, the
official actions of its directors and
officers, the investment and disposition
5

Title 7 of the
by the Financial
7-1-101, et seq.
existed prior to
7 sections which

Utah Code was repealed and substantially amended
Institutions Act of 1981, current Utah Code Ann.
Plaintiffs base their action on Title 7 as it
that time, and any statutory citations to title
follow refer to the pre-1981 statutes.
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of its funds, the security afforded to
members, if any, and to those by whom
its engagements are held, whether or not
it is violating any of the provisions of
law relating to corporations or to the
business of the institution examined,
whether or not it is complying with its
articles of incorporation and bylaws,
and as to such other matters as the
commissioner may prescribe.
Prior to 1969, Grove Finance was licensed as a small
loan business under chapter 10 of title 7 and as an industrial
loan corporation under chapter 8 (R. 771) . In that year, the
Utah Legislature enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as
title 70B of the Code, and repealed chapter 10 of title 7 (see
Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-103) • There were then no more small loan
business licenses in Utah, and Grove surrendered its industrial
loan license, as did many others, electing to be licensed as a
supervised lender under the U.C.C.C. (R. 771-2) . Licensing as
supervised lenders for those previously licensed under title 7
was, by statutory directive, automatic, Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-102
and accompanying Comment of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
Thus, after 1969, the State had no regulatory or
examination authority over Grove Finance under Title 7, because
Grove was then licensed as a supervised lender under title 70B.
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The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y of section 7-1-7 6 c l e a r l y demonstrates
t h a t the i n s t i t u t i o n s l i s t e d were purposely and advisedly
s e l e c t e d by the L e g i s l a t u r e over an extended period of time; the
i n t e n t obviously was t o include only those i n s t i t u t i o n s
s p e c i f i c a l l y enumerated in section 7-1-7 within t h e S t a t e ' s t i t l e
7 j u r i s d i c t i o n and not t o include f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s not so
enumerated.
Enactment of the U.C.C.C. in Utah in 1969 created new
c a t e g o r i e s of f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s (supervised and regulated
lenders) and provided s e p a r a t e f l e s s s t r i n g e n t government
c o n t r o l s on such i n s t i t u t i o n s t o encourage open entry and
competition in t h e cash loan f i e l d .

££. Comment 1 of

Commissioners on Uniform S t a t e Laws to Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-503;

0

L. 1913, ch. 45 f s e c . 4 o r i g i n a l l y provided t h a t " a l l banks
organized under the laws of t h i s S t a t e , and a l l p r i v a t e banks
doing business within the S t a t e and any Loan. Trust and Guaranty
a s s o c i a t i o n s " were subject t o examination. Subsequently,
building and loan a s s o c i a t i o n s , doing business within the S t a t e
(L. 1915, ch. 12, sec. 1 ) ; "pp-operative banks for personal
c r e d i t s " (L. 1915, ch. 120r s e c . 5 and L. 1929, ch. 40, s e c . 1 ) ;

"small loan businesses" <L. 1917, ch. 41, sec. 4); and

" i n d u s t r i a l loan companies" (L. 1925, ch. 116, s e c . 7 and L.
1927, ch. 50, sec. 1) were added t o the S t a t e ' s examination
j u r i s d i c t i o n , and included as section 7-1-8 in R. S. 1933. The
reference to "cooperative banks" was l a t e r changed t o " c r e d i t
unions" (L. 1945, ch. 14, s e c . 1 ) , and "bank s e r v i c e
corporations" were included in t h e section (L. 1963, ch. 7, sec.
3 ) . National banks were i n i t i a l l y excluded from the banking
chapter (L. 1911, ch. 25, sec. 42) and from t h i s section (R.S.
1933, s e c . 7-1-8), but the exclusion was deleted in 1963 (L.
1963, ch. 7, sec. 3 ) . (All emphasis in footnote added).

-3 9-

7 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 242-3 J
Supervised l e n d e r s were not made subject to the
examination and other requirements of T i t l e 7.

F i r s t , from 1969

to 1981, no change was made in any a p p l i c a b l e language of t i t l e 7
to refer to "supervised l e n d e r s " or "regulated l e n d e r s , " even
though those two terms were c l e a r l y defined and t h e i r unique
l e g a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s extensively set out in T i t l e 70B.
s t a t u t e in e i t h e r t i t l e

No

(or elsewhere) empowers the S t a t e to

examine and supervise a l l aspects of the f i n a n c i a l soundness of
supervised and regulated l e n d e r s , much l e s s to deploy an army of
i n v e s t i g a t o r s to ensure t h a t no such e n t i t y ever engages in a
fraudulent or foolhardy investment a c t i v i t y , much l e s s t o
guarantee a l l funds invested in i n s t i t u t i o n s l i c e n s e d as
supervised l e n d e r s .
Second, both the language of the U.C.C.C. and the
comments of the Commissioners on Uniform S t a t e Laws i n d i c a t e t h a t
"supervised l e n d e r s , " subject to U.C.C.C. requirements, are
d i f f e r e n t from "supervised f i n a n c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , " defined as
f i n a n c i a l organizations "subject to supervision by an . . .
agency of t h i s s t a t e . . . . " , Utah Code Ann. 70B-1-30K17) (b) .
Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-503 s e t s forth l i c e n s i n g requirements for
1

See t e x t of comments in Appendix D. This Court has recognized
t h a t the Commissioners' comments are a p p r o p r i a t e aids in
construing provisions of uniform laws, e . g . , S t a t e v.
Intermountain Farmers Association, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah, 1983).
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supervised lenders; comment 3 to that section states:

This section does not Apply to
supervised financial organizations*
Their authority to open new offices at
which the may receive deposits and make
loans is found not in this Actf but in

the statutes otherwise governing those

organizations.

(Emphasis added.)

Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-502(l) states that supervised loans may be
made only by Ma supervised financial organization £JL "one
licensed as a supervised lender.

Comment 1 to this section

notes:
Supervised lenders may include
supervised financial organizations. . .
Since supervised financial organizations
are already subject to a supervision by
a state or federal official or agency,
such organizations are not required to
obtain a license under this Act. . . but
their power may be limited by statutes
other than this Act.
The clear intent is that supervised lenders (such as Grove
Finance) and supervised financial organizations (which Grove
Finance was not) be subject to separate statutory schemes, and
not simply lumped together for regulatory purposes.

While it is

true that supervised financial organizations, already subject to
regulation under other laws, may sometimes also qualify as
supervised lenders, the converse is not true; no statute makes
lenders licensed under Title 70B subject to control under Title

Appellants also claim (Appellants' Brief, p. 9) that
the State had a duty to examine Grove for financial soundness
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under Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-506, requiring the Commissioner to
•"examine periodically . . . the loans, business and records" of
each licensee, and under Utah Code Ann. 7QB-3-505(l):
Every licensee shall maintain records in
conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles and practices in a
manner that will enable the

aamirustratpr tp determine whether the
licensee is complying with the

provisions of this actt The record
keeping system pf e licensee shall be
sufficient if he makes the required

information reegpnably ev&ileble . . • .
(Emphasis added)•
Appellants' interpretation, of course, ignores the statutory
language emphasized above.

The requirement is that records be

kept to permit a determination of compliance with the provisions
of the U.C.C.C.: and if such compliance can be determined, the
record are sufficient.

U.C.C.C. requirements for supervised

lenders relate to disclosure (e.g., Utah Code Ann. 70B-2-301, et
seq. and -3-301, et seq.) and maximum charges (e.g., Utah Code
Ann. 70B-3-508 and -511).

No provision of the U.C.C.C. requires

the State to probe into or insure the financial integrity of
supervised lenders, or to exercise the more stringent supervisory
powers which pertained to title 7 entities.

Furthermore, it is

clear on the record and not disputed that the Grove Finance
records pertaining to supervised loans were generally in
accordance with accepted accounting principles (Sherwood
deposition, p. 39), fulfilling any duty imposed by Utah Code Ann.
70B-3-505(l) .
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The record now before the Court attests that Grove
Finance complied with all reporting requirements, both as a small
loan business and as a supervised lender, and that examinations
by the Department of Financial Institutions indicated no U.C.C.C.
violations, prior to issuance of the cease-and-desist order in
1980 (R. 771-3, 717-47).

Appellants have not alleged that their

loss resulted from any violation of disclosure rules or of
maximum charge limits or of any other substantive restriction on
supervised lenders imposed by the U.C.C.C, and Respondents are
not aware of any such violation.

Appellant would have the Court

go far beyond the statutory directive for the Department to
receive reports and perform examinations for U.C.C.C.
compliance—Appellants would impose a duty on the State to make
all supervised lenders failure-proof and all investments in such
entities loss-proof.

There is simply no basis for concluding

that the Utah Legislature intended to impose such a duty on the
State, or to allow potential enormous liability to result from
the State's examinations.
B.

DUTY QF CARE
The commanding majority of cases considering the issue

have concluded that, even where a statutory duty exists to
regulate financial institutions, no duty of care exists in the
regulating agency upon which tort liability may be based for
disappointed creditors or investors.
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No statutory duty of

supervision exists in the instant matter, but even if it did,
Appellants still could not recover.
Perhaps the best-reasoned of numerous opinions on this
issue are two which concern the failure of Franklin National
Bank, the largest bank failure in United States history.

In

complex litigation involving the F.D.I.C., auditors and insurance
companies, the United States was named as a third-party defendant
on the grounds that bank inspections and other regulatory
functions were performed negligently.

In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445
F.Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y., 1978), the Court considered the
government's motion to dismiss.

In an attempt to establish a

duty running to the bank and its shareholders, the third-party
plaintiffs cited the mandatory language of 12 U.S.C. 481,
providing, "The Comptroller of the Currency . . . .shall examine
every national bank twice in each calendar year. . . . "
(emphasis added).

The Court found no duty on that basis.

Notwithstanding possible incidental
benefits to the examined banks, to hold
that the examinations were therefore
designed to protect the shareholders,
officers or directors from any fraud at
these banks would make the United States
an insurer of all banking activities.
This would be an enormous liability that
should not be read into the statute
absent a clearer expression of
congressional intent. . . . (emphasis
added)•
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The third-party plaintiffs also alleged that the government
assumed a duty toward the bank and its shareholders by extensive
involvement in the daily operations of the bank for a
considerable time before its insolvency.

The Court held that the

government assumed no duty by regulating a bank, such that
negligent regulation would give rise to tort liability.
732.

1£. at

Nevertheless, the Court found this "an extraordinary case,"

where the completion of discovery was necessary, so the motion
was denied, JJGU at 734, without prejudice to a motion for summary
judgment, id. at 728.

Subsequently, in re Franklin National Bank Securities
Litigation, supra, 478 F.Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y., 1979), the
government's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The Court

found no theory of duty (either a statutory duty or an assumed
duty) to be convincing, and noted that, "So far no court has held
that any of the statutory provisions" regarding the Comptroller,
Federal Reserve Bank, or F.D.I.C., "create any actionable duty
running to the regulated institutions."

Id. at 214. The court

stated that supervision of the banking system was for the
protection of the public as a whole, not for the protection of
individual banks and their shareholders.
This analysis has led every court
addressing the issue to conclude that
the Comptroller's mandate to conduct
national bank examinations does not
create an actionable duty running to the

examined bank; the Comptroller's failure
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to detect weakness or dishonesty at an
examined bank gives rise to no cause of
action against the United States. . . .
1£. at 215 (emphasis added).
Other cases where the duty issue has been examined
include First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States. 599
F.2d 588 (3d Cir.f 1979), cert. dfiH.r 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct.
662 (1980), supra (affirming dismissal of action on failure of
F.D.I.C. examiner to warn bank of discovered criminal activities
by bank officer); Harmsen v. Smith. 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir., 1978)
(affirming dismissal of action for Comptroller's negligent
failure to discover illegal practices during bank examination);
Davis v. F.D.I.C,. 369 F.Supp. 277 (D. Colo., 1974) (dismissing
action for failure to notify public of discovered irregularities

in bank); and Social Security Administration Baltimore Federal
Credit Union v. United States, 138 F.Supp. 639 (D. Md., 1956)
(holding of no duty and no liability for negligent failure of
government examiners to discover embezzlement by credit union
official).
In earlier proceedings in this matter, Appellants have
cited Tcherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.r 1978)f cert.
d£H.r 439 U.S. 876, 99 S.Ct. 214 (1978)f and State v. Superior

Court of Maricopa County. 123 Ariz. 324, 599 p.2d 777 (1979),
where regulatory agencies have been found to have a duty running
to creditors of failed financial entities.

These cases are the

only cases so holding, are poorly reasoned and aberrational, and
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have been consistently distinguished and avoided by courts in the
states where they were handed down (££., e.g., Cady v. Statef 129
Ariz. 258, 630 P.2d 554 (1981), and Hicks v. Williams. 104
Ill.App.3d 172, 432 N.E.2d 1278 (1982), and analysis of these
cases at R. 629-33) .

At this junction, it may suffice simply to

point out that (l) Tcherepnin and state v. Superior Court
involved the failure of a savings association and two thrift
associations, respectively—entities whose financial soundness
government had a clear statutory duty to supervise, unlike the
instant case; and (2) the holdings in those cases were based on
repeated statutory references to protection of those in the
plaintiffs' class, an aspect entirely absent from this case.
A far more sound consideration of the question is
Commonwealth. Department of Banking & Securities v. Brown. 605
S.W.2d 497 (Ky., 1980), where the plaintiffs sought damages for
the dereliction of state examiners in not ascertaining or
reporting the true condition of the records of two building and
loan associations.

Reversing a judgment and dismissing the

action, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated:
There is no public policy requiring
government to guarantee the success of
its efforts. When the governmental
entity is performing a self-imposed
protective function as it was in the
case at hand, the individual citizen has
no right to demand recourse against it
though he is injured by its failure to
efficiently perform such function. Any
ruling to the contrary would tend to
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constitute the Commonwealth an insurer
of the quality of services its many
agents perform and serve only to stifle
government's attempts to provide needed
services to the public which could not
otherwise be effectively supplied.
Id. at 499.

Conceding that the state may sometimes act

imperfectly, but finding that risk to be "the natural concomitant
of our form of government," the Court continued:
We perceive that the public interest is
better served by a government which can
aggressively seek to identify and meet
the current needs of the citizenry,
uninhibited by the threat of financial
loss should its good faith efforts
provide less than optimal—or even
desirable—results. Id.
Respondents are not aware of any case, in any
jurisdiction, where an administrator under the U.C.C.C. has been
found liable for any failure to properly regulate a supervised
lender.

As noted above, suits to recover damages for bank

failures have regularly been dismissed; the same result must
obtain, a fortiori, for the failure of a supervised lender, where
government's statutory duty of supervision is far less stringent
than for banks and most other kinds of financial institutions.

m Little Y. Utah State Division of Family Services,
supra. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983), this Court recently applied a
duty-risk analysis in reviewing a negligence judgment, relying on
Professor Thode's article, "Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v.
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between
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Judge and Jury," at 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1.

According to Professor

Thode, the duty-risk determination of whether the legal system's
protection extends to the risk in question—i.e., whether the
risk to which the plaintiff was subjected was within the scope of
the defendant's duty—is entirely a legal question for the court
to determine, based upon a weighing of public policy and other
pertinent considerations.

Thode, £p. jcii^r 26-28; see Little,

supra. 667 P.2d at 54, where the Court looks to applicable
statutes in determining the scope of the duty of a state agency.
In the instant matter, the absence of statutory duty
has already been discussed, and the sound public policy grounds
for finding no duty are evident.

If government is found to have

a duty upon which tort liability can be based toward every person
affected by an activity which government must, by statute,
regulate, then government becomes an insurer for the total safety
and soundness of all regulated activities.

In particular, if, as

here, an agency is charged by statute with limited regulatory
duties for a particular kind of business, and on that basis a
duty is inferred to protect all parties from any loss arising
from any activity of the business, it is difficult to foresee the
extent to which government's liability for not providing an
injury-free society may extend.
Furthermore, there is and can be no allegation here
that any action or inaction of Respondents gave rise to any
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justifiable reliance by Grove Finance investors on which any
theory of an assumption of duty could be based.

From 1969 on,

the Department of Financial Institutions did not examine or
regulate supervised lenders for financial soundness, and that
policy applied across the board to all supervised and regulated
lenders licensed under the U.C.C.C. (R. 772, 786).
There is simply no basis, statutory, common-law,
common-sense, or otherwise, to extend the State's duty to
protecting all investors in Appellants" class.

As a matter of

law, no liability may be found.
III. APPELLANTS' CHALLENGE TO THE MONETARY
LIABILITY LIMITS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT ON EQUAL PROTECTION GROUNDS
WAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED IN THE DISTRICT
COURT; IS NOT RIPE FOR DECISION IN THIS
ACTION; AND IN ANY EVENT, HAS NO MERIT
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In Point V of their Brief, Appellants argue that the
statutory limit on the amount which may be recovered in an action
against a governmental entity or employee, currently codified in
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34,8 violates the equal protection
provisions of the United States Constitution (Fourteenth
Amendment, sec. 1) and Utah Constitution (article I, sec. 24).
8

At the time Grove Finance closed its doors, Utah Code Ann.
63-30-34 instructed courts to reduce judgments against
governmental entities and their employees to the dollar limits
then set out in Utah Code Ann. 63-30-29; see text of these
sections in Utah Code Ann., 1981 pocket supplement to second
replacement volume 7A and in Appendix B herein.
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This Court has held that issues not raised in the trial
court on motions for summary judgment may not be raised for the
first time on appeal and be considered, e.g., Franklin Financial

v« New Empire Development company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1983),
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah, 1983).

The same rule

applies to the raising of constitutional issues, where no
individual's liberty is at stake, Pratt v. City Council of City
of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah, 1981) .

A review of each of the

memoranda of law submitted by Appellants below, pertaining to
their own and Respondents' summary judgment motions (R. 656-87,
838-63, 949-59), fails to disclose any mention of a
constitutional question as to the liability limits.
matter raised in oral argument.

Nor was the

The issue not having been raised

or considered below, it may not be raised now for the first time.
Furthermore, this Court has very properly disfavored
the rendering of advisory opinions, particularly on
constitutional issues, where a challenged statute has not been
applied to a litigant's disadvantage:
[A] fundamental rule of long-standing is
that unnecessary decisions are to be
avoided and that the courts should pass
upon the constitutionality of a statute
only when such a determination is
essential to the decision in a case. A
constitutional question does not arise
merely because it is raised and a
decision is sought thereon. . . .
A further fundamental rule is that the
courts do not busy themselves with
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advisory opinions. . . It has been found
to be far wiser, and it has become
settled as a general principle, that a
constitutional question is not to be
reached if the merits of the case in
hand may be fairly determined on other
than constitutional issues.
Hoyle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah, 1980).

An appellant

affected by one portion of a statute or act may not attack the
constitutionality of another portion of the same act not
applicable to his case, Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 351-2
(Utah, 1979).
As of 1980, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34 stated:
If any judgment or award against a
governmental entity . . . or against a
governmental employee . . . exceeds the
minimum amounts . . . specified in
section 63-30-29, the court shall reduce
the amount of the judgment or award to a
sum equal to the minimum requirements
•

• • •

By its clear terms, the statute does not apply unless and until a
judgment or award in excess of the statutory limits is entered.
Of course, no judgment of any kind has been entered in this case,
and it is entirely problematic and speculative at this point
whether or not any judgment in excess of the statutory limits
will ever be entered.

Appellants clearly seek an advisory

opinion on a statute which has not been, and may never be,
applied to them.

The question is not ripe for decision (and, in

any event, Respondents submit that the non-constitutional grounds
set forth in Points I and II herein are dispositve of this case).
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Finally, even assuming arguendo that the issue is
properly before the Court, Appellants1 legal argument simply does
not hold water.

Numerous courts have upheld statutory limits on

governmental liability under equal protection attack, pursuant to
both the Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutional
provisions, e.g., Packard v. Joint School District No. 171# 104
Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (Ida. App., 1983); Leliefeld v. Johnson,

104 Idaho 357, 659 p.2d i n (1983); Winston Vt Reorganized School
District R-2r 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo., 1982); Sambs v. City of
Brookfield. 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980), cert, den., 449
U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 611 (1981); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90
Wis.2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979); Estate of Cargill v. City of

Rochester, 406 A.2d 704

(N.H.,

921, 100 S.ct. 1304 (1980).

1979), appeal dismissed/ 445 u.s.

Each of these cases held, applying

the "rational basis" test for equal protection, that the
limitation statutes reasonably served a valid legislative
objective:

"To compensate victims of government tortfeasors

while at the same time protecting the public treasury."
v. Brown County, supraf 280 N.W.2d at 719.

Stanhope

These cases are fully

in line with the strong line of cases holding that state tort
claims and governmental immunity acts do not violate federal and
state equal protection guarantees, e.g., Brown v. Wichita State
University, 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan., 1976), and cases cited therein
at 1026.

Brown also applied a "rational basis" test, and noted,
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•'There are no cases which hold governmental immunity invalid
based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."

Id. at 1029.

This Court has consistently looked to a "rational
basis" test for its equal protection analysis where no
fundamental right is in question, holding that a legislative
classification "must be merely rationally related to a valid
public purpose" to withstand Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny.

Utah

Public Employees' Association v. State, 610 P,2d 1272, 1273
(Utah, 1980).
When neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect classification is involved,
equal protection requires that statutory
classifications bear a reasonable
relation to the purpose sought to be
accomplished and that there be a
reasonable basis for the distinction
between the classes.
J.J.N.P. Company v. State, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah, 1982).
This same "rational basis" test applies when an equal protection
attack is based upon Article I, section 24 of the Utah
Constitution, IJQ. ; Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah,
1982) .
It is also noteworthy that the United States Supreme
Court has applied a "rational basis" test in reviewing the equalprotection validity of statutes limiting the amount of monetary
liability for nuclear incidents, Duke Power Company v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620
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(1978); see also Continental Insurance Company yt Illinois
Department of Transportation, 709 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1983) ,
suggesting that a "rational basis" test would be the appropriate
equal-protection means of review of a state statute limiting
governmental liability to $100,000•
Respondents submit that there is no fundamental right
to have unlimited recovery against governmental entities; that,
therefore, the "rational basis" test is the proper means of
assessing Utah's liability limits under both state and federal
constitutional equal protection provisions; and that the
liability limits are rationally related to the valid public
purpose of providing some measure of recovery for injured parties
while protecting the fiscal means or providing necessary
governmental services.
Appellants have cited what appears to be the only case
invalidating a state liability limit and applying a "strict
scrutiny" test rather than a "rational basis" test, white v.
State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont., 1983).

Yet even that court

acknowledged, "We recognize that some limit on the State's
liability may comport with the constitutional guarantees of equal
protection."

Xd. at 1275. The White ruling invalidated a

statutory scheme which limited recovery of economic damages and
completely barred recovery of non-economic damages, a result
inapposite to Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34, which makes no such
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distinction.

The Montana Court based its result on a state

constitutional provision guaranteeing a "speedy remedy . . . for
every injury of person, property, or character" (Montana
Constitution article II, section 16), similar to Utah's
guarantee of a "remedy by due course of law" for "an injury done"
to one's "person, property or reputation. . ." (Utah
Constitution article If section 11).

This Court has recently

ruled that sovereign immunity does not violate article I, section
11, Madsen v. Borthick. supra, 658 P.2d at 629.
Also, it has been recognized that the white decision
deviates from decisions in "the vast majority of courts which
have held that statutes limiting or barring governmental
liability are measured by the rational basis test," Ryszkiewicz
v. City of New Britain. 193 Conn. 589, 479 A.2d 793, 799 (1984),
and cases cited therein.

Respondents submit that the white case

reaches an aberrant conclusion, based upon a particular statutory
approach which does not resemble Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34, and is
not sound precedent as to the application of Utah and federal
constitutional analyses.
This Court has recently recognized that a statute may
violate article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution where it
is "so shot-through with exceptions as to be incapable of
reasonably furthering the statutory objectives."
no. 17606, slip op. at 16 (Utah, May 1, 1984).
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Malan v. Lewis,
This is not such

a case.

Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34 applies across the board to all

parties who are granted judgments in excess of the specified
limits, suggesting no ••crazy-quilt'1 or discriminatory pattern of
application.

Furthermore, Madsen V. BorthicK, supra, emphasized

that sovereign immunity "was a well-settled principle of American
common law at the time Utah became a state," 658 P.2d at 629, and
hence, at the time Article I, section 24 was enacted.

Absolute

sovereign immunity did not violate that section, and it clearly
would not be violated by a statutory provision which waives
immunity up to certain levels of recovery, and operates uniformly
on all who recover judgments in tort up to or over those levels.
In sum, no basis exists for Appellants' contention that
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34 violates state and federal equal
protection principles—even if that question were properly before
the Court.
CONCLUSION
Regulation of financial institutions is a governmental
function, subject to provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.

The substantive exceptions to the Act's waiver of immunity

in Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(a), (c), (d), and (f) clearly bar
suit in this matter, and the District Court's order should be
affirmed.
As a matter of law, Respondents had no statutory duty
and no duty of care upon which liability may be based, extending
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to Appellants,

To hold otherwise would go far toward a legal

requirement impossible of attainment that governmental agencies
with limited regulatory responsibilities in a given area must
somehow render injury-proof all activities undertaken by private
parties in the area.
Appellants' attempt to raise the issue of whether
Utah's governmental liability limits (Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34)
violate equal protection is not well-founded as a matter of law,
and in any event is untimely and not ripe for decision, and
should be disregarded.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day Q f/4^V^^W;
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Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MATHEW FENN HILTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al.,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NOS. C-82-5165

:

C-82-5872
C-82-3798
(Consolidated)

Defendants.

The Motions-of the plaintiffs for Summary Judgment, and the
reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment of the defendants all
came on regularly for hearing on November 3, 1983. Argument
was had on that date, and the hearing was continued to November 8,
1983 for further argument.

The matters before the Court in the

above-referenced civil numbers have all been consolidated
into one action.

All interested parties were present or

represented by counsel at the hearings above-referenced.

Counsel

argued their respective positions, and the Court granted
defendants' Motion to open and publish Depositions of Howard
Sherwood and Mirvin Borthick.

The Court took the matter under

advisement to further review the extensive Memoranda filed by
the parties, and to review the case law cited by counsel. The
Court has now carefully considered the arguments advanced by

HILTON, ET AL VS,
BORTHICK, ET AL

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

the respective parties, and the case law authority cited by
all counsel to the controversy, and otherwise being fully
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision.
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Based upon the Court's review of this matter, including
the Affidavits, Depositions and matters in the file and the legal
authorities cited, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs' Motion
for Summary Judgment must be denied in that there are existing
significant and material issues of fact to be determined by the
trier of fact.

The material issues of fact prohibit this Court from

passing on the questions presented as a matter of law on a
motion for summary judgment.

Likewise, plaintiffs1 more limited

request, presented orally at the time of the argument in this
matter, that this Court determine at this stage of the proceedings
what statutory duties, if any there be, apply to the facts of
this case, must also be denied.

This Court should not, under

the disputed facts of this case, determine what statutory
standards may apply to the defendants at this stage of the
proceedings.

Such a decision should be made when the evidence

is in, or sufficient evidence is presented to allow this Court
to reach some determinations on the respective theories of
liability, and make appropriate decisions based upon the evidence
then presented as to what statutory duties or other duties
that may run from the defendants to the plaintiffs may be-

HILTON, ET AL VS.
BORTHICK, ET AL

PAGE THREE

MEMORANDUM DECISION

DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As to the defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, and
that portion thereof which seeks a ruling of this Court that
$11 obligations toward the plaintiffs were adhered to as a
matter of law by the defendants, this Court must similarly deny
such a request as was done in the plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary
Judgment, there being substantial and material questions of fact
remaining for determination.
Dealing with that portion of the defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity,
the Court is compelled to reach a substantially different result.
Based upon the case authority cited by the defendants, including
the Utah Supreme Court language in Madscn vs. Borthick,
656 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), supervision of a financial institution,
as was the situation here, constitutes a governmental activity.
Accordingly, unless the governmental immunity statute waives
governmental immunity, the action must be dismissed.

Under the

laws of this state, governmental immunity has been waived for
negligent acts and/or omissions of state employees, unless
the conduct falls into those specific exceptions listed in
Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
Addressing the question as to whether or not the alleged conduct
of. the defendants falls into the exceptions where governmental
immunity is not waived under the subparts of Section 63-30-10,
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this Court finds that the defendants' arguments are persuasive.
The claims asserted against the defendants arise out of acts or
omissions that fall into the exceptions listed in Section 63-30-10.
The nature of defendant Borthick''s actions or claimed failure
to act, even if such were proven, are discretionary, and
do not fall into a class of activities where governmental
immunity has been waived. *The alleged misrepresentations of the
defendants are not waived under Section 63-30-10.

The alleged

errors of the defendants in issuing or revoking licenses
are also not waived under Section 63-30-10.

The foregoing,

coupled with the policy reasons enumerated by the Supreme Court
for not imposing liability on public officials who perform
discretionary functions in good faith, leads this Court to the
conclusion that that portion of the defendants1 Motion for
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity
is well taken and should be the finding of this Court in this
case.

It follows that as no claim against the state can be

maintained, there therefore can be no claim against Commissioner
Borthick.

Plaintiffs' claims against the defendants are

therefore dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity.
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an appropriate
Order in conformance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit
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jthe same to the Court for review and signature pursuant "to
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice for the District and Circuit
Courts of the State of Utah.
Dated this

Sty

day of April, 1984.

pi
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

APPENDIX B
TEXT OF STATUTES AND RULES CITED
(Note: The texts of session laws and of statutes cited only by
chapter or sub-chapter are not included).
1.

Utah

Utah Constitution, article Ir section 11:
All courts shall be open, and every
person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party,

Utah Constitution article If section 24:
All laws of a general nature shall
have uniform operation.

Utah Code Annt 7-1-6 (prior to repeal in 1981):
The bank commissioner, with the
advice and consent of the governor, may
appoint such examiners as shall be
required for the proper conduct of the
banking department; one of whom he may
designate as chief examiner at a salary
to be fixed in accordance with standards
adopted by the department of finance,
who in the absence of disability of the
bank commissioner shall exercise all of
the powers of the bank commissioner,
except those required of him as a member
of any board. Such examiners shall hold
a corporate surety bond in such form and
in such amount as shall be determined by
the state department of finance,
conditioned for the faithful performance
of his duties. The premium on such bond
shall be paid by the state. Such
examiners shall not be interested
directly or indirectly in any
institution under the supervision of the
banking department. They shall perform
such duties as are prescribed by this
title or that may be assigned to them by
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the bank commissioner. The bank
commissioner may also with the approval
of the finance commission employ such
clerical help as may be necessary for
the proper carrying on of the work of
the banking department. The salaries of
examiners and of such assistants shall
be fixed in accordance with salary
standards adopted by the department of
finance and shall be payable monthly as
the salaries of other state employees
7-1-7 (prior to repeal in 1981):
All banks, all loan and trust
corporations, all building and loan
associations, all industrial loan
companies, all credit unions, all small
loan businesses required to obtain a
license under any provision of law, and
all bank service corporations shall be
under the supervision of the banking
department, and shall be subject to
examination by the bank commissioner and
the examiners.
7-1-8 (prior to repeal in 1981):
The bank commissioner, or an
examiner, shall visit and examine every
bank, savings bank, every loan and trust
company, every small loan business, and
every co-operative bank, at least once
in each year. At every such examination
careful inquiry shall be made as to the
condition and resources of the
institution examined, the mode of
conducting and managing its affairs, the
official actions of its directors and
officers, the investment and disposition
of its funds, the security afforded to
members, if any, and to those by whom
its engagements are held, whether or not
it is violating any of the provisions of
law relating to corporations or to the
business of the institution examined,
whether or not it is complying with its
articles of incorporation and bylaws,
and as to such other matters as the
commissioner may prescribe.
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Utah Code Ann, 35-9-13(d):
If the administrator arbitrarily or
capriciously fails to seek relief under
this section, any employee who may be
injured by reason of such failure, or
the representative of such employees,
may bring an action against the
administrator in the district court of
the county in which the imminent danger
is alleged to exist or the employer has
its principal office, for a writ of
mandamus and for further appropriate
relief.
Utah Code Ann, 63-30-4 (prior to amendment in 1983):
Nothing contained in this act,
unless specifically provided, is to be
construed as an admission or denial of
liability or responsibility in so far as
governmental entities are concerned.
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by
this act, consent to be sued is granted
and liability for the entity shall be
determined as if the entity were a
private person.
The remedy against a governmental
entity or its employee for an injury
caused by an act or omission which
occurs during the performance of such
employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority
is, after the effective date of this
act, exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding by reason of the same
subject matter against the employee or
the estate of the employee whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim, unless
the employee acted or failed to act
through gross negligence, fraud, or
malice.
An employee may be joined in an
action against a governmental entity in
a representative capacity if the act or
omission complained of is one for which
the governmental entity may be liable,
but no employee shall be held personally
liable for acts or omissions occurring
during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment
or under color of authority, unless it
is established that the employee acted
or failed to act due to gross
negligence, fraud or malice.
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Utah Code Ann, 63-30-10(1):
Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of his employment
except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function,
whether or not the discretion is abused,
or
•

• •

(c) arises out of the issuance,
denial, suspension, or revocation of, or
by the failure or refusal to issue,
deny, suspend or revoke, any permit,
license, certificate, approval, order,
or similar authorization, or
(d) arises out of a failure to make
an inspection, or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection of
any property, or
(e) arises out of the institution
or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if
malicious or without probable cause, or
(f) arises out of a
misrepresentation by said employee
whether or not such is negligent or
intentional,
Utah Code Ann, 63-30-29 (prior to repeal in 1983):
Every policy or contract of
insurance purchased by a governmental
entity as permitted under the provisions
of this chapter shall provide:
(a) In respect to bodily injury
liability that the insurance carrier
shall pay on behalf of the insured
governmental entity all sums which the
insured would be legally obligated to
pay as damages because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom, sustained by any
person, caused by accident, and arising
out of the ownership, maintenance and
use of automobiles, or arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of
premises, and all operations necessary
or incidental thereto, or in respect to
other operations and caused by accident

—-i \ r —

subject to a limit, exclusive of
interests and costs, of not less than
$100,000 because of bodily injury to or
death of one person in any one accident
and, subject to said limit for one
person, to a limit of not less than
$300,000 because of bodily injury or
death of two or more persons in any one
accident.
(b) In respect to property damage
liability that the insurance carrier
shall pay on behalf of the insured
governmental entity all sums which the
insured would in the absence of the
defense of governmental immunity be
legally obligated to pay as damages
because of injury to or destruction of
property, including the loss of use
thereof, caused by accident, and arising
out of the ownership, maintenance and
use of automobiles, or arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of
premises, and all operations necessary
or incidental thereto, or in respect to
other operations and caused by accident
to a limit of not less than $50,000
because of injury to or destruction of
property of others in any one accident.
Ptfth Code hnn. 63-30-34 (prior to amendment in 1983):
If any judgment or award against a
governmental entity under sections
63-30-7, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10,
or against a governmental employee for
which a governmental entity may have a
statutory duty to indemnify the
employee, exceeds the minimum amounts
for bodily injury and property damage
liability specified in section 63-30-29,
the court shall reduce the amount of the
judgment or award to a sum equal to the
minimum requirements unless the
governmental entity has secured
insurance coverage in excess of said
minimum requirements in which event the
court shall reduce the amount of the
judgment or award to a sum equal to the
applicable limits provided in the
insurance policy.
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Any governmental entity that acts
as a self-insurer under section 63-30-28
is liable for any judgment or award
entered against it or its employee under
sections 63-30-7, 63-30-8f 63-30-9, and
63-30-10, and is liable to indemnify its
employees against personal liability in
accordance with sections 63-48-1 through
63-48-7, but only to the extent of the
minimum amounts for bodily injury and
property damage liability specified in
section 63-30-29, and no judgment or
award shall be entered in such action in
excess of such minimum amounts.
Utah Code Ann, 70B-1-301(17) (prior to recodification as -301(8)
in 1983:
"Supervised financial organization"
means a person, other than an insurance
company or other organization primarily
engaged in an insurance business,
(a) organized, chartered, or holding an
authorization certificate under the laws
of this state or of the United States
which authorize the person to make loans
and to receive deposits, including a
savings, share, certificate or deposit
account, and
(b) subject to supervision by an
official or agency of this state or of
the United States.
Utah Code APPt 7QB~3-5Q2(1):
Unless a person is a supervised
financial organization or has first
obtained a license from the
administrator authorizing him to make
supervised loans, he shall not engage in
the business of:
(a) making supervised loans, or
(b) taking assignments of and
undertaking direct collection of
payments from or enforcement of rights
against debtors arising from supervised
loans, but he may collect and enforce
for three months without a license if he
promptly applies for a license and his
application has not been denied.
(See Commissioners' comments in appendix D, inlia.) .
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Utah Code Ann. 7QB-3-5Q5 (prior to amendment in 1983):
(1) Every licensee shall maintain
records in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles and
practices in a manner that will enable
the administrator to determine whether
the licensee is complying with the
provisions of this act. The record
keeping system of a licensee shall be
sufficient if he makes the required
information reasonably available. The
records need not be kept in the place of
business where supervised loans are
made, if the administrator is given free
access to the records wherever located.
The records pertaining to any loan need
not be preserved for more than two years
after making the final entry relating to
the loanf but in the case of a revolving
loan account the two years is measured
from the date of each entry.
(2) On or before April 15 of each year
every licensee shall file with the
administrator a composite annual report
in the form prescribed by the
administrator relating to all supervised
loans made by him. The administrator
shall consult with comparable officials
in other states for the purpose of
making the kinds of information required
in annual reports uniform among the
states. Information contained in annual
reports shall be confidential and may be
published only in composite form.
(See Commissioners' comment in Appendix D, infxa).
UUfr Code Ann, 7QB-3-5Q6:
(1) The administrator shall examine
periodically at intervals he deems
appropriate the loansr business, and
records of every licensee. In additionf
for the purpose of discovering
violations of this act or securing
information lawfully required, the
administrator or the official or agency
to whose supervision the organization is
subject (section 70B-6-105) may at any
time investigate the loans, business,
and records of any regulated lender.
For these purposes he shall have free
and reasonable access to the offices,
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places of business, and records of the
lender. • . .
(See Commissioners1 comment in appendix D, infra).
Utah Code Ann, 7QB-3-508 (prior to amendment in 1983):
(1) With respect to a supervised loan,
including a loan pursuant to a revolving
loan account, a supervised lender may
contract for and receive a loan finance
charge not exceeding that permitted by
this section,
(2) The loan finance charge, calculated
according to the actuarial method may
not exceed the equivalent of the greater
of either of the following:
Utfrh Code Ann> 70B-3-511 (prior to amendment in 1983):
(1) Regulated loans, not made pursuant
to a revolving loan account and in which
the principal is $1,000 or less, shall
be scheduled to be payable in
substantially equal installments at
equal periodic intervals except to the
extent that the schedule of payments is
adjusted to the seasonable or irregular
income of the debtor, and
(a) over a period of not more than
37 months if the principal is more than
§300, or
(b) over a period of not more than
25 months if the principal is $300 or
less. Nothing herein shall prevent full
payment without penalty, and provided
further, interest may be charged only to
date of prepayment. Except as
specifically provided for in this act.
(2) The amounts of $300 and $1,000 in
subsection (1) are subject to change
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment
of dollar amounts (section 70B-1-106).

Utah Code Amu 7QB-9-1Q2:
All persons licensed or otherwise
authorized under the provisions of Title
7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, on the
effective date of this act are licensed
to make supervised loans under this act
pursuant to the part on Regulated and
Supervised Loans (sections 70B-3-501 to
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7QB-3-514) of the chapter on Loans
(sections 70B-3-101 to 70B-3-605), and
all provisions of that part apply to the
persons so previously licensed or
authorized. The administrator may, but
is not required to, deliver evidence of
licensing to the persons so previously
licensed or authorized.
(See Commissioner's comment in Appendix Dr Infxfi)•

Utah Code Annf 7QB-9-1Q3;
(1) The following acts and parts of the
acts are repealed:
(a) Chapter 10 of Title 7, Utah
Code Annotated 1953; . . . .
2.

Federal

U« S. Constitution! Fourteenth Amendment, section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
12 U.S.C. 481 (prior to amendment in 1980):
The Comptroller of the Currency,
with the approval of the Secretary of
the Treasury, shall appoint examiners
who shall examine every national bank
twice in each calendar year, but the
Comptroller, in the exercise of his
discretion, may waive one such
examination or cause such examinations
to be made more frequently if considered
necessary. . . The examiner making the
examination of any national bank shall
have power to make a thorough
examination of all the affairs of the
bank and in doing so he shall have power
to administer oaths and to examine any
of the officers and agents thereof under
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oath and shall make a full and detailed
report of the condition of said bank to
the Comptroller of the Currency. . . .
The examiner making the examination
of a national bank shall have power to
make a thorough examination of all the
affairs of the affiliate, and in doing
so he shall have power to administer
oaths and to examine any of the
officers, directors, employees, and
agents thereof under oath and to make a
report of his findings to the
Comptroller of the Currency. . . .
28 U.S.C. 2680 (Federal Tort Claims Act):
The provision of this chapter and
section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply t o —
(a) Any claim based upon an act or
omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
. . .

(h) Any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights. . . .
3.

Other states

California Government Coder section 818«6:
A public entity is not liable for
injury caused by its failure to make an
inspection, or by reason of making an
inadequate or negligent inspection, of
any property, other than its property
(as defined in subdivision (c) of
Section 830), for the purpose of
determining whether the property
complies with or violates any enactment
or contains or constitutes a hazard to
health or safety.

Montana Constitution, article II, section 162
Courts of justice shall be open to
every person, and speedy remedy afforded
for every injury of person, property, or
character. No person shall be deprived
of this full legal redress for injury
incurred in employment for which another
person may be liable except as to fellow
employees and his immediate employer who
hired him if such immediate employer
provides coverage under the Workman's
Compensation Laws of this state. Right
and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay.

APPENDIX C
Excerpts from Proceedings of the 36th Session of the Utah
Legislature, House of Representatives, Day 32 (Feb* 11, 1965),
Disc. 1, Side 2, on file with the Clerk, Utah House of
Representatives:
SENATOR WELCH:
This is a matter which needs some explanation, and
that's why I'm pleased to be before you to explain what went on
and that frankly what has happened in three of our neighboring
states. And this, ladies and gentlemen, is of importance and
should be considered seriously by all of you, whether you are
interested in the schools, whether you are interested in the
county governments, the city governments, or in the State
government. In the State of California, about two years ago, we
judicially abolished governmental immunity in that State. Almost
immediately, the State was flooded by lawsuits. This is so
serious that the Governor had to call in a special session of the
Legislature, and they established a moratorium for one year on
suits. The Legislature then met and the special committee was
set up somewhat similar to the one that we had, and that special
committee came up and a bill was passed, a series of bills was
passed, in California, in which they have followed a somewhat
similar procedure to that which we follow. And that gentlemen
and ladies is a matter of Mopen the doorway a little bit,11 and
I'll explain to that just a little bit later on.

REPRESENTATIVE LOVERIDGE:
I would like Senator Welch to explain section 3 on page
1 and 2 of the bill if he will please.
SENATOR WELCH:
Section 3 is just setting up governmental immunity. As
I explained to you, what we did, we followed the California
practice by setting up statutorily governmental immunity. We say
there is immunity, except as we provide in this bill, and then we
carve out of that certain exceptions, such as driving automobiles
and doing this and that, whereby we can bring an action. This is
to avoid multiplicity of suits, I can't quite explain what they
might be, but all kinds of things which would be a bother and a
hindrance to the governmental entities. So actually what this
does is establish by statute the fact of governmental immunity,
and that's all that does.
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APPENDIX D
Excerpts from Comments of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.)
Preface, (In their prefatory note to the 1968 final draft of the
U.C.C.C. (the version adopted by Utah as U.C.A. title 7 0 B ) , the
Commissioners stated that the "basic assumptions" on which the
Code was predicated include:)
First, the successful American Way of
permitting competition to determine
prices of non-monopoly commodities and
services should also be allowed to apply
to the pricing of money and credit:
•

• •

Fourth, for competition effectively to
determine the pricing of money and
credit requires:
a. for credit grantors, relatively

easy entry into the market to avoid
monopoly?
b. for knowledgeable and
sophisticated credit recipients,

eliminating or at least minimizing
controls;
c. For the protection of less
knowledgeable and less sophisticated
credit recipients:
1. uniform disclosure of the costs
and terms of credit . . .
2 . ceilings on the price of
credit, restrictions on creditors'
rights and remedies, and enhancements of
debtors 1 rights and remedies sufficient
to prevent overreaching by creditors
without unduly limiting the availability
of credit;
3. administrative powers and selfexecuting judicial remedies ample to
assure compliance with statutory
requirement. . . .
7 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 242-3 (emphasis
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added).

Comments to Utah Code Ann, 70B-3-5Q2;
1. Supervised lenders may include
supervised financial organizations.
Section 1.301(17). Since supervised
financial organizations are already
subject to supervision by a state or
federal official or agency, such
organizations are not required to obtain
a license under this Act from the
Administrator but their powers may be
limited by statutes other than this Act.
Section 1.108. Other persons making
supervised loans in this State or taking
assignments of loans for collection or
enforcement in this State must obtain a
license from the Administrator.
•

• •

3. Licenses need not be renewed
annually; such a requirement would
merely increase the administrative
burdens of the Administrator and the
licensee. This section requires a
licensee to obtain only one license to
operate one or more offices in the
State. While the single license permits
the licensee to locate offices wherever
he chooses, he must annually notify the
Administrator of the location of each
office. Section 6.202. . . .
Comments to Utah Code Ann, 7QB-3-5Q3:
1. This section is intimately
related to disclosure (Part 3 of Article
2 and Part 3 of Article 3) and to
maximum charges (Part 2 of Article 2 and
Part 2 of Article 3). The purpose is to
facilitate entry into the cash loan
field so that the resultant rate
competition fostered by disclosure will
generally force rates below the
permitted maximum charges. . .
2. A secondary purpose is to
reduce the likelihood of establishing
localized monopolies in the granting of
cash credit. . . •

3.

This section does not apply to

supervised financial organizations.
Their authority to open new offices at
which the may receive deposits and make
loans is found not in this Act but in

the statutes otherwise governing those
organizations.
• . . (Emphasis added.)
Comments to Utah Cofle Ann. 7QB-3-5Q5:
1. This section seeks to give to
the licensee wide discretion in the
method of keeping records. No rigid
requirements are imposed with respect to
the method of record keeping. Instead,
records are acceptable if kept in
accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, and if they
enable the Administrator to determines
whether the licensee is complying with
the Act. Modern techniques frequently
require that records be kept in one
central placef which in the case of
multi-state lenders may be outside the
State. This section allows central
record keeping and allows records to be
kept anywhere so long as the
Administrator is given free access to
them. See Section 3.506(2).
2. Licensees are required to file
composite annual reports; information
need not be given as to individual loan
outlets. This allows the Administrator
to compile statistics to aid him in his
duties and to provide the Legislature
with information necessary for a proper
evaluation of the effectiveness of the
Act. This section provides for
confidential treatment by the
Administrator of information contained
in annual reports. The Administrator
may not publish information concerning
individual lenders; all information
published must be in composite form.
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Comment to Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-506:
1. This section provides for
periodic examinations of supervised
lenders but there is no requirement of
annual examinations. The Administrator
may tailor his examination policy as he
sees fit. . . Under Section 6.106 the
Administrator has general authority to
investigate any person who he has
reasonable cause to believe has engaged
in an act which is subject to action by
the Administrator. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
Comment to Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-1Q2;
This section provides automatic
licensing under Article 3f Part 5, for
all lenders previously licensed under
the State's licensed lender statutes
prior to the effective date. No
application or administrative action is
required and the formal license under
the prior statute, which will be
repealed, will be a license under Part 5
of Article 3
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